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## 19 Social Capital and Advocacy Coalitions: Examples of Environmental Issues from Ecuador

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### Introduction to Advocacy Coalitions

Policies – their formation and their implementation – depend on power. Grassroots groups that come together around a perceived threat or opportunity that is influenced by policy or its implementation have little power compared with groups and organizations that are regional, national or international in scope. Furthermore, the fact that groups and organizations come from different sectors – market, state and civil society – makes having a voice that will be listened to even more difficult. Thus local groups generally use one of two tactics: protest (violent or non-violent) or supplication. One is based on power to mobilize locally and the other is based on ability to show abject need. Neither tactic is particularly effective in the development process.

In this chapter, we examine how local groups in a rural region of Ecuador formed and reformed advocacy coalitions to influence policy of immediate concern in their daily lives. We build on a tradition of analysis that has focused first on policies, and then on impacts. We start with locally identified threats and opportunities to determine

the degree to which locally generated advocacy coalitions can influence policy not only at the local, but also at the national and even the international level.

### Theoretical Approach

Local groups both depend on and distrust the three sectors (market, state and civil society) that are outside their local domain. The market provides incentives for production and ensures efficient distribution of traded goods and services. However, in many cases, market firms have extracted wealth from the locality and left environmental destruction. A well-functioning state provides the rules under which the market functions and enforces those rules. Yet states have been corrupt and made rules in ways that profit only the wealthy or those who hold political power. A robust and diverse civil society reduces transaction costs in the other two sectors by building trust and diversifying social networks, and, in the best of circumstances, provides social values that legitimize the state's regulation of the market. However, civil society organizations can also use localities to further their

larger goals, without attention to long-term local consequences.

Thus, local groups seeking to influence the larger events that impact them directly are of two minds when seeking allies to help them in their cause. They must weigh the added power of an international non-governmental organization (NGO) or green firm against the possibility of being only a tool for gaining a market share among donors or buyers.

We have chosen to conduct policy research by examining relationships among grassroots groups and these three sectors using an *advocacy coalition framework* (ACF). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993), who developed the framework, argue that organizations, agencies and firms form alliances, or advocacy coalitions, around concrete issues in order to achieve common desired futures. These public and private institutional acts at various geographic scales thus share: (i) certain basic beliefs that anchor common desired futures (ends); (ii) mental causal models, implicit or explicit means for reaching those futures (means); and (iii) rules of evidence that allow for members of the coalition mutually to ascertain progress towards the goals. By determining from each potential ally where it wants to go (their declared and implicit missions) and how they think they will get there (the means they see as viable and effective), local groups can seek appropriate alliances for varying periods of time – advocacy coalitions – in order to work towards their desired future in light of the specific threat or opportunity.

It follows, then, that effective advocacy coalitions share common desired futures and *mental causal models* (perception of relationship between ends and means) but are also sufficiently diverse in their contacts and external linkages to garner a diversity of resources and information/knowledge. They are effective in combining *bridging* and *bonding* social capital (see Narayan, 1999). In a group with high bonding capital, members know one another in multiple settings or roles.<sup>1</sup> Bridging social capital connects diverse groups within the community to one another and to groups outside the community.

Bridging social capital, like Granovetter's (1973) *weak ties*, tends to involve instrumental single-purpose linkages between two groups or individuals.

A coalition in which the members share common goals and a degree of consensus on appropriate evidence for showing whether they are progressing towards those goals is more likely to endure than is a marriage of convenience. The richer a coalition is in bridging social capital, the more likely it will be able to increase its access to and appropriately to combine the human, financial and natural capital that are necessary for it to prevail or negotiate effectively with an opposing coalition. Advocacy coalitions incorporating a diversity of institutions – from multiple sectors and representing various geographic scales – are likely to have access to more diverse information and resources than a less diverse or more geographically isolated coalition. Furthermore, success by such a coalition in reaching its goal is likely to strengthen bridging and bonding social capital further.

Having common desired futures does not ensure that different entities will cooperate to achieve those ends. If groups have different mental causal models, it may matter little that they share similar desired futures. Alternatively, desired futures may differ sharply, making any sort of cooperation or compromise quite unlikely. In either case, two or more oppositional advocacy coalitions may form, resulting in gridlock, or in the triumph of a powerful coalition over a socially excluded or poorly organized one.

Unlike Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993), we believe that economic interests, although introducing methodological challenges, must be taken into account in a model that seeks to understand policy formation. Historical analysis of previous issues, alliances and movements is helpful in this regard. Bourdieu's (see Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) perspective on the unequal ability of different social classes to wield social and cultural capital is more helpful to us than is Coleman's (1988) view of social capital, because Bourdieu is explicit about economic interests and about political power (see Sharp *et al.*,

2003, for a way to link community power to network analysis).

In the ACF, policymaking is not unilinear. It is contested and manoeuvred by different sectors from different levels (Münch *et al.*, 2000). Nor can policymaking be captured in a series of prescribed steps to be taken by decision makers, which if appropriately executed would almost automatically lead to optimum decisions. Such an overly rationalist element often creeps into decision-making models that take a technical rather than a political approach.

ACF can be understood as a specification of stakeholder analysis (SA) (Clarkson Centre for Business Ethics, 1999), which is much better known and widely practised than is the ACF. SA was initially developed within management science to deal with the political problem of externalities – firms and agencies were often blindsided by civil society groups that were negatively affected by their projects and policies, often derailing those efforts. An example is the failure of a state-market coalition, which included McNamara's Defense Department and large firms in the aircraft industry, to build a Supersonic Transport during the Johnson Administration, due in part to their inability to anticipate the strong opposition of environmentalists (cited in Freeman, 1984, pp. 136–139). They needed a way to identify these less obvious stakeholders, who were most likely to wreck the implementation of their plans because they failed to negotiate with them up front. Mason and Mitroff (1981, pp. 98–99) used the example of the snail darter and the environmentalists, who, fearing its extinction, nearly stopped the construction of a dam project. The focus on a single firm or a state-market coalition of powerful players meant that SA initially was rather vertical in its orientation (Grimble and Chan, 1995).

If a firm or a government agency wanted to implement a particular project or change a particular policy, which groups might it attract as allies and which would be likely to oppose it? A first cut in identifying these individual or institutional *stakeholders* (those likely to be affected by or to affect the

project or policy) could result from looking at the relevant *interests* of different entities (Freeman, 1984, p. 135). SA has evolved and broadened so that horizontal and vertical relationships can be assessed. Indeed, analysis of coalitions has been included as part of the methodology. Participatory approaches are used to identify stakeholders and to identify and shape the projects or policies so that few stakeholders will be hurt by the project/policy (Grimble and Chan, 1995).

The ACF methodology focuses explicitly on institutional actors and the coalitions that develop among those actors or stakeholders. The methodology mimics the policy-making or decision-making process by identifying existing issue-specific coalitions (and potential or emerging coalitions) and bringing coalition members physically together, for the purposes of gathering data (if a strict research project) and/or for cementing and strengthening such coalitions (if the project is more applied).

The building of coalitions is based first on identification of common desired futures and similar rationalities (mental causal models) for achieving those goals (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Information becomes a tool in coalition formation. The ACF assumes that institutional actors consider information to be relevant and useful if it is congruent with their experience and interests. This is quite different from the policy analysis approach that assumes 'sound science' will resolve conflicts (Münch *et al.*, 2000).

The ACF uses multiple methods tentatively to identify inter-institutional coalitions; this is not unique among stakeholder approaches. What is different is the sorting of the entities by their desired future states and their rules of evidence for judging what actions move them toward those states. The coalitions thus identified have emergent qualities: the commonalities in goals and mental causal models gives them the characteristic of a social group in which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. It may also mean that the coalition is only *emerging* in another sense rather than existing full-blown. It is this characteristic that gives the theory an inherent applied

element. The analyst becomes more than a casual observer but must take a stance vis-à-vis the different coalitions, for the method of gathering data in groups can either foster or fail to foster the solidification of different coalitions, depending on how the focus group is organized and directed.

Advocacy coalitions arise when institutional groups of actors see problems and their solutions in an integrated fashion and seek appropriate collective action. Thus, a typical advocacy coalition can be characterized as 'emerging' rather than institutionalized. They are ever changing as certain groups are incorporated and others drop out. This is not to say that advocacy coalitions do not have structure. They tell us a great deal about patterns of relationships. Even though particular entities may enter and exit a coalition with alacrity, the aggregation of interest that an advocacy coalition represents has greater permanence than the participation of any single institutional actor. Advocacy coalitions serve as structures that allow us to identify the social location of institutional actors and to analyse the discourse that is carried forward to support their positions, often in juxtaposition to another coalition that is taking a contrary (or at least a contrasting) position. These coalitions are submerged within a larger universe of discourse in which the actors attempt to persuade others that a particular decision could benefit a greater number of interests than would the alternative decision. Such persuasion depends on building bridging social capital.

Our approach to advocacy coalitions is to begin with a local issue and the groups that have formed around them. With those groups, we identify potential institutional actors at various levels, and policies (existing or potential) that are relevant to that coalition of actors. In the course of the research, policies of various state, market and civil society actors are identified to modify or leverage. Because policy formation and implementation is a dialectic and dynamic process, we monitor how those coalitions change over time.

### Examples of Advocacy Coalitions from Ecuador

In the following section, we illustrate the advocacy coalition approach with concrete examples. In northern Ecuador, we examined advocacy coalitions around the issues of: (i) governance of the Cotacachi Cayapas Ecological Reserve on which the canton of Cotacachi abuts; and (ii) whether what would probably be open-pit copper mining will occur in the semi-tropical part of Cotacachi, called Intag. The two examples involve one issue in which desired futures were (and probably still are) reconcilable under a compromise solution (the reserve), but immediate interests vary. In the case of the mining controversy in Intag, a compromise solution is difficult because the desired futures of the actors are quite divergent, and because of the size of the proposed project. With the power of certain external actors, a win-win solution is not readily imaginable. We examine bridging social capital in opposing coalitions in terms of the incorporation of market, state and civil society organizations and in the way in which ties to different levels are utilized, i.e. coalitions that include market, state and civil society, and embrace entities at all levels – local, regional, national and international – can be said to have considerable bridging social capital. That social capital can in turn compensate for initial low levels of power in negotiations.

#### Context

Although the Andean (highland) sector of Cotacachi covers only 20% of the canton, it is home to > 60% of its population. The highlands are the ancestral home of the indigenous population of the canton. The traditional *haciendas* are also located here. Cotacachi was largely untouched by the land reform of the 1960s, but disputes are principally over scarce water rather than land *per se*. Because of their smallholdings, indigenous peasants practise 'circular migration' – young people and male heads of household work in other parts of Ecuador,

but return home for holidays (see Flora, Chapter 18, this volume). Women generally tend the small plots of land. The economy of this highland microregion is based on three main activities: agriculture, artisanry (particularly leather goods) and tourism. In the past decade, agroindustrial firms that specialize in non-traditional export products – flowers, asparagus and fruit – have come to provide significant local employment.

The tourist and hotel trade emerged in the 1970s. The Cotacachi-Cayapas Ecological Reserve was established in 1968, and includes Cotacachi mountain and the crater Lake Cuicocha, an important tourist point. The city of Cotacachi is only a few miles off the Pan-American highway. Its nearness to the famous Otavalo market undoubtedly leads to some spillover tourism.

In Cotacachi, there is a thick organizational network (bonding social capital), particularly in the rural part of the Andean zone. The community (*comuna*) is the traditional organizational form of the indigenous population of the highlands. The rural population of the semi-tropical zone, consisting mostly of *mestizos*, is also organized into cooperatives, agricultural and livestock associations, and an environmental organization that has spearheaded the opposition to mining.

The most important peasant organization in the highlands is UNORCAC. Since UNORCAC's founding in 1978, it has focused on cultural and political issues. It has fostered a strong bilingual education movement and, over the years, has brought political pressure to bear for government services in rural highland areas. It has been rather effective in building links with the outside (bridging social capital) and has succeeded in obtaining grants from national and international foundations and NGOs (Báez *et al.*, 1999, pp. 64–65).

#### Methodology

Issues chosen for analysis involved some local mobilization, cross-cut sectors and

were policy relevant. We analysed documents produced by each key organization involved in the chosen issues to determine publicly expressed and collectively desired futures and mental causal models. Then key organizational leaders were interviewed to understand how the issue has unfolded, the role of their organization and others in that process, and to elicit names of other institutional actors. Interviews were conducted in snowball fashion as relevant organizations were identified, starting with interviews with core organizations in each likely coalition. Desired futures and mental causal models were then mapped based on both documents and the interviews. The interviews supplied basic information to form focus groups consisting of local organizations that are or have the potential to become an advocacy coalition. Preliminary assessments regarding desired futures and composition of advocacy coalitions were tested against the interpretations of relevant actors in the focus groups.

The advocacy coalition diagrams presented below were drawn based on information garnered principally from the in-depth key informant interviews with a representative of the main organizations in the coalition. We entered all documents and transcriptions of each interview and focus group into a database, which we analysed using N-Vivo software. Analysis of desired future states and mental causal models allowed us to determine the degree to which desired future states are homogeneous within a coalition and heterogeneous between coalitions focused on the same issue.

### Tourism and Management of the Cotacachi Cayapas Ecological Reserve

In the context of the discourse regarding tourism as an alternative 'development pole', the Mayor's office contracted a consultant to recommend how tourism initiatives could be put into practice. He proposed that a mixed public-private firm

be established to manage the tourist 'circuit' that extends from the city of Cotacachi to Lake Cuicocha. Bolstered by the legal structure for decentralizing management of natural resources, the Mayor's office initiated a petition to the Minister of Environment to concede the administration of the concessions around Lake Cuicocha to a mixed tourism management company (referred to hereafter as the Mixed Company). The firm was immediately organized with private capital, largely from urban *mestizo* stockholders, and with funds from the Municipality.

Shortly thereafter, UNORCAC asked the Ministry of the Environment to transfer the management of various tourist points within the reserve to UNORCAC in order to maintain the management integrity of the natural resources in the entire highland portion of the reserve.

In response to these two requests, the Ministry asked the Mayor's office to develop an integrated proposal to be based on agreement among all parties interested in managing the resources of the reserve: the Municipality, UNORCAC and Incamaki (an indigenous artisan and tourism organization that currently manages the boating service at Lake Cuicocha). The Ministry suggested that the three principal interested parties form a 'management board' to administer resources of the reserve, but suggested no mechanisms for reaching a mutually acceptable compromise. The Municipality (jointly with the Mixed Company), UNORCAC and the Incamaki Association each presented the Ministry with distinct proposals for management of different parts of the reserve. The Ministry does not have the organizational capacity – or the will – to broker an agreement. Its most recent move was to invest the Municipality, because it forms part of the Ecuadorian government hierarchy, with the mandate to organize the administration of the bioreserve. This has given the green light to the Mixed Company to take charge of certain concessions, but has not resulted in a decision regarding a management plan for the entire bioreserve. This may be because the Municipality also does not have the

resources (either organizational or financial) or the political will to broker a management plan for the reserve. The national government has transferred no resources to the Municipality for administering the reserve, although if a plan were adopted, presumably the Municipality would collect the entrance fees to the park and assign them to whatever entities that would be given responsibility for protecting the park's natural resources and biodiversity. Thus, it appears that a *de facto* privatization of the most lucrative activities within the reserve has occurred, thereby reducing the degrees of freedom available for designing a decentralized administration of the entire bioreserve. The Ministry of Environment continues to enforce environmental laws within the reserve.

#### What are the diverse interests behind the various proposals and can they be reconciled?

The Mayor's ethnic and organizational background is central in understanding his potential and limitations in representing the general interest. His legitimacy with the mestizo population is based squarely on his ability to respond 'even handedly' (as perceived by the mestizos) to the interests of the two main social groups in the canton: mestizos and indígenas. In this case, the Mayor must overcome the image held by mestizos that any indigenous person is lacking in the knowledge of how to carry out public functions. Arguably he did that when he won re-election in April 2000 with 80% of the vote, including the support of a majority of mestizos and virtually all indigenous voters. He has emphasized institutional modernization of local government and efficiency in managing natural resources, which, in the case of management of the bioreserve, involves pursuing the dual goals of conservation and commercial tourism development. The Mixed Company is a concrete manifestation of that vision. Also, his training as an economist (at the University of Havana) may have contributed to his favouring a more

technocratic and less participatory approach to administration of the reserve.

#### Identification of advocacy coalitions around governance of the reserve

The discourse that cements the coalition centred on the Municipality is that of entrepreneurial development, which resulted in greater support for the Mayor from the sector of the mestizo population that is involved in tourism and retail business (Fig. 19.1).

UNORCAC has built another advocacy coalition with itself at the centre. This coalition consists of the leaders and technical people (staff and contracted) of the SLO (Secondary Level Organization) itself its constituent communities that are located inside the reserve and within its buffer zone; the Incamaki Association, whose interests are compatible with the UNORCAC proposal although it has presented its own tightly focused proposal; and a Dutch NGO,

called AGRITERRA, that works closely with UNORCAC.

The desired futures of the two coalitions are not so different. Both support: (i) administrative decentralization of natural resource management that benefits the locality; and (ii) management of natural resources as natural capital to be invested for both present and future generations. For the group that has formed the Mixed Company, the most appropriate rationale is an entrepreneurial one that would generate resources for local self-management and for individual stockholders. The coalition around UNORCAC, without discarding entrepreneurship, believes it is essential to build a future in which not only are the conditions for the reproduction of the peasant communities within maintained, but their quality of life is raised. Many in the entrepreneurial coalition believe that UNORCAC lacks management capacity (even though it has been shown in other areas) and would therefore put at risk the tourism project that




Fig. 19.1. Advocacy coalitions around issue of governance of the Cotacachi Cayapas Biological Reserve, Cotacachi, Imbabura, Ecuador.

is a central axis of development of the canton. For the indigenous-led coalition, the entrepreneurial tourism proposal would benefit a social group that already has better economic conditions, and therefore would exacerbate the substantial inequality of access to resources that already exists.

Inspection of Fig. 19.1 shows that both coalitions consist of entities from all three sectors and at various levels from local to international. Of considerable importance is the fact that there are a number of institutions that form a bridge between the two coalitions. At the time of this writing, none of these 'bridging' entities has stepped forward to broker a solution.

### The Mining Controversy

The second example is that of the controversy over mining in Intag, the semi-tropical part of the canton. The opposition coalition is centred on a local environmental NGO, DECOIN (*Defensa y Conservación Ecológica de Intag*; Defense and Ecological Conservation of Intag) which includes middle-class environmentalists who have chosen to live in the area and longer-term residents of various backgrounds as its members. The other coalition centres on the Ministry of Energy and Mines. Their view, backed up by advisors from the World Bank, is that the western slope of the Andes is not apt for agriculture and tourism, and that the need for increasing foreign exchange is a central national concern during this period of great financial stress.

The opposition coalition felt it needed information on the environmental impacts of open pit mining, so, with financial help from the national and international environmental groups in the coalition, it sent a delegation to visit open pit mines in Peru. Their visit included the Oroya mine in the central Peruvian highlands. This coalition's rules of evidence are experientially, not scientifically, based. They visited people and places where what they opposed had already occurred. It could be argued the Oroya mine, in a desolate part of the

highlands of Peru, which continues to pollute air and water, is an inappropriate comparison for a mine in the semi-tropical mountain area of Ecuador. However, the evidence of impact is stark, and the community members who went to Peru reported back to Ecuador that even the music from Oroya is sad – surely a result of what has happened to the land.

The opposition group, DECOIN, also organized a trip to Japan and asked the Mayor of Cotacachi to lead the delegation. They had previous contacts with environmental groups in that country, who organized their trip within Japan. The opposition coalition also attempted to engage the Ecuadorian Ministry of Energy and Mines on the residents' own turf. The Ministry, in a counter offer, invited them to Quito. The standoff was broken by DECOIN's occupation of the prospecting camp that had been built by Mitsubishi Metals. They then invited the Assistant Secretary of Mines to come and meet with them. When they had received no response by the third day, they carefully inventoried all the machinery, carted it off the premises and left it in the safekeeping of the Mayor. Then they burned the camp down. While this discouraged Mitsubishi Metals from opening what would most probably have been an open pit copper mine, the Ministry of Energy and Mines remains determined to regroup.

Local people are split on the issue. Some are strongly in opposition and others believe that the lack of jobs and income in this physically rugged area and the primitive nature of access roads all point to mining as an effective engine of growth and modernization for the area. The opposition argues just as vehemently that a way of life would be destroyed. They recognize that it is not enough to show that mining is harmful to the environment and to residents, and have proposed and implemented some economic alternatives. For instance, they organized some 200 farmers into an organic coffee cooperative and, using contacts they made in Japan, have made an initial shipment of coffee at a premium price to that country. The Mining section of the World Bank is strongly supportive of the

mining alternative but, unlike the Ecuadorian Ministry they are advising, World Bank personnel insist that local people must participate in the decision-making process, although they are not sure how to carry that out in view of presumed illegitimate tactics used by those opposing the mines. They were concerned about the burning of the prospecting camp, although the opposition group was careful not to damage the equipment.

Figure 19.2 shows the two advocacy coalitions of the mining controversy. Two aspects are striking: the lack of civil society organizations in the pro-mining coalition, and a shortage of entities that bridge the two coalitions and which might serve to mediate between the two factions. The World Bank is committed to local involvement, but the Ministry of Energy and Mines is not. Neither knows how to mobilize the local population directly, nor would such a top-down approach be likely to be successful. Local supporters of mining, who formed the backbone of the opposition to the Mayor

in the recent election, are hesitant to even meet together publicly for fear of intimidation by the Mayor's supporters, who coincided with the opposition to mining.

Only two entities have potential to bridge the two coalitions. One is the Ministry of the Environment, which has little clout vis-à-vis the Ministry of Energy and Mines, and the Mayor of Cotacachi, who was mentioned favourably by both sides. His strong win in the recent elections and the apparent imperious behaviour of his local supporters (many of whom oppose the mining project) in victory may have dimmed his star as a possible mediator. The inherent winner-take-all nature of a decision about mining (strip mining will either happen or not happen and mitigation of its impact can only go so far) also makes it difficult to find individuals or institutions willing to broker a solution.

The local anti-mining coalition was effective in stopping the mining company from coming into the area. That coalition then filed a complaint with the World Bank




Fig. 19.2. Advocacy coalitions around issue of mining in Intag, Cotacachi, Imbabura, Ecuador.

concerning the management of a larger project on the geology of Ecuador, which they contended would inflict environmental damage because, by publishing the results of a study of mineral formations, mining interests would know exactly where to mine to extract the minerals and despoil the land. They further claimed that the study was carried out without due regard for environmental damage in the bioserve area.

The World Bank appointed an Investigative Committee, which found that basically the rules of the World Bank were followed and reaffirmed that no mining would take place in biological reserves. This was viewed as a victory by the local advocacy coalition. With support of the World Bank and with Ecuadorian governmental funds, the Ministry of Energy and Mining, in collaboration with the Ministry of the Environment, is putting together a handbook on community use of the geological information for local planning purposes. They have also hired two Ecuadorian environmental NGOs – Fundación Pronatura and CEDA (Centro Ecuatoriana para la Defensa del Ambiente) – to form 'puntos focales' (monitoring groups) with local organizations and institutions around bioserves to report activity that threatens it. They have also set up a web page, where individuals can post suspected violations of the laws against exploitation of the bioserves. The World Bank is promoting these two innovations in other countries. It is doubtful that all this would have occurred without the locally based advocacy coalition with its multiple ties and concerted action.

Ironically, the mental causal model and desired future conditions of the original nucleus of the anti-mining advocacy coalition has hardened to the point that they turned down the opportunity to form the community-based punto focal for the Cotacachi Cayapas Reserve. Thus another group, adjacent to a different part of the reserve, was recruited to provide the information to protect the reserve. The olive branch offered by the Ministry of Mines to DECOIN was rejected. Nine such organizations, inspired in part by the experience in Cotacachi, are now functioning across

Ecuador, and more are being established. There was policy impact at the regional, national and international level.

### Conclusion

The advocacy coalition approach is a useful way of understanding how issues develop over time to influence policies broader than their immediate concerns. In the case of governance of the bioserve, there is considerable room for compromise and reconciliation. Yet stalemate has resulted, in spite of the fact that desired futures of different institutional actors are not very different. Why? We believe that the focus on activities and short-term outputs (in this case, the rush to develop plans for tourism and governing parts of the reserve), rather than long-term outcomes, has obscured common values and shared desired futures. Once alliances were initially made, the groups focused on building bonding social capital and reinforcing their positions, rather than looking for shared interests. The Ministry of Environment may be at fault in calling for proposals without first bringing interested parties together to discuss goals for the reserve in order to articulate shared interests from the beginning.

The mining issue presents much starker choices. Few institutions bridge the two entrenched advocacy coalitions. The World Bank became the brokering institution after the initial blockage of the mining effort in order to increase local participation in decisions surrounding the exploitation of natural resources. New systems of education and vigilance have been instituted by the Ecuadorian government with local organizations in order to protect bioserves from exploitation and increase the options of local entities – market, state and civil society – in appropriately using geological resources in their area.

The ACF helps in description and analysis of grassroots-identified policy resolution. It helps pinpoint key areas where the power of negotiation can be equalized among groups. However, it also reveals areas where contested power shifts the conflict

from how to achieve ends to who controls the means of getting there. The shift back to specific positions from shared interests reduces the size of the advocacy coalitions, and decreases attention to processes and relationships, to the potential detriment of the community (Daniels and Walker, 2001).

When the advocacy coalitions fall apart, it is not only because of the lack of a bridging institutional actor. When members of the coalition focus too much on bonding social capital, and fail to maintain bridging social capital with the diverse groups who share pieces of their desired future conditions and agreement on at least some of the ways to achieve them (mental causal models), the coalitions fail. In such cases, those at the core distrust anyone who does

not wholly share their desired future conditions and their blueprint of how to get there. They have moved beyond negotiation and back to the less effective tactic of making demands. Now they have fewer allies to stand behind those demands. Thus internal as well as external forces can destroy advocacy coalitions, even when they are successful in changing national and international policies.

### Note

- <sup>1</sup> See, for instance, Granovetter's (1973) concept of *strong ties*; Freudenberg's (1986) concept of *density of acquaintanceship*, and Coleman's (1988) concept of *closure*.

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